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Generative AI in EU law: Liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity

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ABSTRACT

The complexity and emergent autonomy of Generative AI systems introduce challenges in predictability and legal compliance. This paper analyses some of the legal and regulatory implications of such challenges in the European Union context, focusing on four areas: liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity. It examines the adequacy of the existing and proposed EU legislation, including the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), in addressing the challenges posed by Generative AI in general and LLMs in particular. The paper identifies potential gaps and shortcomings in the EU legislative framework and proposes recommendations to ensure the safe and compliant deployment of generative models.

1. Overview

Since the release of ChatGPT at the end of 2022, Generative AI in general, and Large Language Models (LLMs) in particular, have taken the world by storm. On a technical level, they can be distinguished from more traditional AI models in various ways.¹ They are trained on vast amounts of text and generate language as output, as opposed to scores or labels in traditional regression or classification [1, pp. 4–7], [2]. Often, Generative AI models are marked by their wider scope and greater autonomy in extracting patterns within large datasets. In particular, LLMs' capability for smooth general scalability enables them to generate content by processing various inputs from several domains. Many LLMs are multimodal (also called Large Multimodal Models, LMMs), meaning they can process and produce various types of data formats simultaneously: e.g., GPT-4 can handle text, image, and audio inputs concurrently for generating text, images, or even videos (e.g., Dall-E and Sora integrations). However, while advanced LLMs generally perform well across a broad spectrum of tasks, this comes with unpredictable outputs, raising concerns over the lawfulness and accuracy of LLM-generated texts [3].

As powerful LLMs like GPT-4 and Gemini, image and video

generators rise, their very momentum throws into stark relief the question of the adequacy of existing and forthcoming EU legislation. In this article, we discuss some key legal and regulatory concerns brought up by Generative AI and LLMs regarding liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity. The EU's response to these concerns should mainly be contextualised within the legal framework of the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), which comprehensively addresses the design, development, and deployment of AI models, including Generative AI within its scope. Other instruments of EU law will be taken into account if relevant. Where we identify gaps or flaws in the EU legislation, we offer some recommendations to ensure that Generative AI models evolve lawfully. This contribution is structured as follows. [Section 2](#) addresses the challenges and potential solutions concerning liability for AI, focusing on Generative AI and LLMs. It examines two EU regulatory proposals, the PLD and AILD, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. Key issues include the scope of liability, determining defectiveness and fault, and evidence disclosure. Recommendations for improvement include refining Generative AI model classification, incorporating new criteria for evaluating fault and defectiveness, and enhancing evidence disclosure requirements.

[Section 3](#) addresses the critical privacy and data protection

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¹ While Generative AI encompasses a broader range of systems than LLMs, their overlapping legal concerns necessitate considering them together. However, we will maintain a focus on LLMs.

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challenges concerning data memorization, model inversion attacks, and processing personal data in prompts. The section examines the legal framework, particularly the GDPR, and its implications for AI training, data processing, and user rights. Key issues include the legal basis for AI training and processing prompts, information requirements, model inversion, data leakage, automated decision-making, protection of minors, and purpose limitation. Potential solutions include a tailored GDPR exemption for AI training, adapting data governance measures, and implementing privacy-preserving techniques. The section also emphasizes the importance of the opt-out right and machine unlearning for enhancing data privacy in LLMs.

Section 4 addresses the intellectual property (IP) challenges of Generative AI, particularly copyright and patent issues. It discusses the legality of using copyrighted material for LLM training, the applicability of the text and data mining (TDM) exception, and potential copyright infringement in LLM-generated outputs. The section also explores the possibility of granting IP protection to AI-generated creations, highlighting the anthropocentric nature of IP law and the debate surrounding this issue. Potential solutions include requiring LLMs to respect opt-outs and considering a broader interpretation of the TDM exception.

Finally, Section 5 addresses the cybersecurity challenges, focusing on the EU's Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and AI Act. It highlights the need to adapt the CRA to explicitly include Generative AI, ensuring alignment with the AI Act's risk-based classification. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of stringent cybersecurity measures for all general-purpose AI systems, given their potential vulnerabilities. The section also discusses technical safeguards against adversarial attacks and the potential role of the Digital Services Act in tackling misinformation. It concludes by exploring how the NIS2 Directive can enhance cybersecurity for Generative AI, particularly in areas not fully covered by the CRA.

2. Liability and AI act

33 % of firms view "liability for damage" as the top external obstacle to AI adoption, especially for LLMs, only rivalled by the "need for new laws", expressed by 29 % of companies.² A new, efficient liability regime may address these concerns by securing compensation to victims and minimizing the cost of preventive measures. In this context, two recent EU regulatory proposals on AI liability may affect LLMs [4]: one updating the existing Product Liability Directive (PLD) for defective products,³ the other introducing procedures for fault-based liability for AI-related damages through the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive (AILD).⁴ While an interinstitutional agreement has been reached on the text of the new PLD,⁵ the AILD is currently parked in the legislative process but may be taken up again once the AI Act has entered into force.

The two proposals offer benefits for regulating AI liability, including Generative AI and LLMs. First, the scope of the PLD has been extended to include all AI systems and AI-enabled goods, except for open-source software, to avoid burdening research and innovation (Rec. 13 PLD;

but see Rec. 13a PLD: covered if integrated into commercial product⁶). This is advantageous as the PLD is the only harmonized European liability law with a strict liability regime applicable in specific instances. Second, the PLD acknowledges that an AI system can become defective based on knowledge acquired/learned post-deployment, thereby extending liability to such occurrences (Article 6(c) PLD). Third, the AILD covers claims against non-professional users of AI systems and recognizes violations of fundamental rights among eligible damages (e.g., Article 4(6) AILD). Finally, perhaps most importantly, both proposals acknowledge AI's opacity and the information imbalance between developers and users or consumers. This is addressed both in the recitals and through specific mechanisms, such as the presumption of causality in the AILD (Article 4) and the rules on the burden of proof and transparency in the Product Liability Directive (PLD) (Articles 9 and 13). Thus, they introduce disclosure mechanisms and rebuttable presumptions, shifting the burden of proof to providers or deployers (AILD Articles 3 and 4; PLD Articles 8 and 9). For instance, under Article 8 PLD and Article 3 AILD, claimants only need to provide plausible evidence of potential harm. At the same time, defendants must disclose all relevant information to avoid liability, with non-compliance to this disclosure leading to a (rebuttable) presumption that the defendant has breached its duty of care.

However, both AILD and PLD reveal three major weaknesses (see below) when used in the context of Generative AI, largely stemming from their dependence on the AI Act (AIA), which appears ill-suited to govern LLMs effectively. Although the text of the AIA is now stable, it is important to consider improvements in the next legislative phases, such as the comitology procedure enabling implementing acts, before the AIA is enforced, which is expected to happen no earlier than 2026. For Generative AI and LLMs – labelled as General Purpose AI (GPAI) models – obligations will apply sooner, precisely 12 months after the AIA's entry into force (1 August 2024). For existing GPAIs on the market, when the AI Act rules are applied, this transition period is extended to 24 months (Art. 83(3) AIA).

2.1. Scope

The disclosure mechanism and rebuttable presumption of a causal link in the AILD only apply to high-risk AI systems under the AIA. Hence, the primary issue here is to establish whether and under what conditions Generative AI (and LLMs) might fall under the scope of the AILD and its liability mechanism.

While drafting the AIA, GPAI models were first classified as high-risk by default. Subsequently, the risk assessment shifted to consider their downstream application (e.g., if used in a high-risk context such as a judicial settings). Finally, the consolidated version has provided a distinct classification. They carry a set of distinct, overarching obligations (Articles 53 ff., AIA). This framework introduces a tiered risk classification that diverges from the traditional high, medium, or low-risk categories: (1) providers of *standard* GPAI must always ensure detailed technical and informational documentation, also to enable downstream users to comprehend their capabilities and limitations, intellectual property law adherence (e.g., copyright Directive), and transparency about training data (Article 53, AIA); (2) providers of *openly licensed* GPAI models, i.e., with publicly accessible parameters and architecture, need only meet technical documentation requirements (Article 53, point 2); (3) providers of GPAI models posing *systemic risks* must fulfill standard obligations and additionally conduct model evaluations, including adversarial testing (red teaming), assess and mitigate risks, document and report incidents to the AI Office, and maintain adequate cybersecurity protection (Article 55(c), AIA). This also applies to open-source models. A GPAI model is considered to pose systemic

² European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content, and Technology, European enterprise survey on the use of technologies based on artificial intelligence: final report, Publications Office, 2020. The survey refers to the broader category of natural language processing models, pp. 71-72.

³ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products (COM/2022/495 final).

⁴ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (COM/2022/496 final).

⁵ See Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 2022/0302 (COD), Doc. 5809/24 of Jan. 24, 2024, Letter sent to the European Parliament (setting out the final text of the PLD).

⁶ See the corresponding policy suggestion and argument made in (Hacker 2023a, at footnote 107).

risks if the Commission, either on its own initiative or based on recommendations from the scientific panel, recognizes it as having high-impact capabilities. This recognition must be based on specific technical metrics and is automatically presumed if the model's training involves $>10^{25}$ floating-point operations (FLOPs) (Article 52a). The rationale behind using FLOPs as a benchmark is the belief that higher computational resources indicate more sophisticated models, which may have broader impacts on society.⁷

The Commission advises providers of GPAI models with systemic risks to create a code of conduct with expert help, demonstrating compliance with the AI Act (Article 55 AIA). This is especially important for outlining how to assess and manage risks for GPAI models with systemic risks. As a result, GPAIs with systemic risks are likely to be subjected to the disclosure mechanism and rebuttable presumption in the AILD.

While these revisions to the AIA represent a positive step toward more effective risk assessment, concerns remain. So, for instance, the three-tier classification system for GPAIs – standard, openly licensed, and systemically risky – may fail to account for the peculiarities of downstream applications, potentially leading to over-inclusive or under-inclusive risk categories [5,6]. The same definition of systemically risky GPAI models, primarily based on the computational resources used for training (FLOPs), may not capture their multidimensional nature: they depend on various factors such as the application context, model architecture, and the quality of training, rather than just the quantity of computational resources used. FLOPs offer only a partial perspective on dangerousness and do not account for how different, non-computational risk factors might interact and potentially lead to cascading failures, including interactions among various LLMs. Finally, the very threshold of 10^{25} FLOPs as a risk parameter is questionable [7]. LLMs with 10^{24} or 10^{23} FLOPs can be equally risky (e.g., GPT-3; Bard). This is further compounded by the trend towards downsizing LLMs while maintaining high performance and associated risks, such as in the case of Mistral's Mixtral $8 \times 7B$ model [8]. Again, while this is an ancillary issue, as the AI Office will have the power to adjust this parameter, relying solely on FLOPs as a risk indicator remains inadequate.

The AILD, proposed in September 2022, predates the drafting process of the final text of the AIA, which has undergone significant changes, particularly with the rise of LLMs in 2023. Therefore, it is necessary to update the AILD to align with the new technologies, risk categories, and obligations introduced in the AIA. A question arises regarding which type of Generative AI models the disclosure and rebuttable presumption mechanism should apply to. Given that all providers of GPAI models, including those with open licenses, will be subject to rigorous transparency and recordkeeping obligations, it seems reasonable to extend the disclosure mechanism and rebuttable presumption of causal link to all of them. This is because they are assumed to have the necessary information in case of incidents, and their failure to provide it can be used as a presumption of violating the standards set by the same AIA. However, the AILD's liability rules may prove overly stringent for some GPAI models, suggesting the need for exemptions. To facilitate these exemptions, additional criteria for classifying GPAI models are necessary.⁸ Similarly, the AI Act introduces criteria that prevent AI systems operating in Annex III from being automatically deemed high-risk; they must instead present a *significant risk* to people or the environment. Likewise, Article 7 of the AIA empowers the Commission to adjust the high-risk designation by adding or removing specific applications or categories. A similar approach for GPAI could exempt certain Generative AI models from AILD's strict requirements.

This could involve tailoring the three-tier classification to real-world Generative AI risk scenarios [5,9], based not only on computation potency but on their specific deployment contexts, considering the potential harms to assets and individuals (Bender et al. 2021).⁹ For example, in the employment sector — deemed high-risk by the AIA — the risk levels can significantly differ between using LLMs just for resume screening optimization or for automated virtual interviews, where biases could be more common and human oversight less effective. Alternatively, exemptions for GPAI models could be established by aligning the three-tier system with the broad application areas designated for AI systems (e.g., Annex III). This way, models used in lower-risk areas, such as video games, could be exempted from the AILD's more stringent liability rules.

2.2. Defectiveness and fault

The two directive proposals assume that liability may arise from two different sources—defectiveness (PLD) and fault (AILD)—that are both evaluated by compliance with the requirements of the AIA. Both presume fault/a defect in case of non-compliance with the (high-risk systems) requirements of the AIA (Article 9(2)(b) PLD; Article 4(2) AILD), requirements which could also be introduced at a later stage by sectoral EU legal instruments.¹⁰ However, these requirements may not be easily met during the development of Generative AI, particularly LLMs: e.g., their lack of a single or specific purpose before adaptation [10] could hamper the predictions of their concrete impact on the health, safety, and fundamental rights of persons in the Union which are required by the AIA risk management system and transparency obligations (Articles 9 and 13). Moreover, as just mentioned, further requirements are likely to be introduced in the EU regulatory framework concerning GPAI models.

To enhance the effectiveness and reliability of Generative AI models, a necessary recommendation is to combine the conventional AI fault and defectiveness criteria with new methods specifically designed to align with their technical nuances. This may imply that the compliance requirements for evaluating faults and defectiveness should prioritize techniques for steering the randomness of their non-deterministic outputs over their intended purposes. Indeed, their capability for smooth general scalability enables them to generate content by processing diverse inputs from arbitrary domains with minimal training (Ganguli et al. 2022). To this scope, several techniques might be incentivised by the regulator, also concurrently, e.g., temperature scaling, top-k sampling, prompt engineering, and adversarial training (Hu et al. 2018). Methods for tempering the randomness may also include the so-called regularization techniques, like the dropout, which involves temporarily disabling a random selection of neurons during each training step of Generative AI models, fostering the development of more robust and generalized features [11]. Consequently, it prevents the model from overfitting, ensuring more coherent and less random outputs.

Furthermore, compliance requirements for Generative AI and LLMs should also prioritize monitoring measures. These measures would serve to verify that the models operate as planned and to pinpoint and amend any divergences or unfavourable results. For example, calculating the uncertainty of outputs could be instrumental in recognizing situations where the model may produce highly random results [12]. Such information is vital for end-users to have before using, for instance, an LLM,

⁷ However, the Commission must adjust the threshold as technology advances, like better algorithms or more efficient hardware, to stay current with the latest developments in general purpose AI models.

⁸ These can be introduced both in the Commission's delegated acts and throughout the standardization process.

⁹ The PLD, which is not tied to the risk categories of the AIA in terms of applicability, cannot do all the work because its provisions apply only to professionals – economic operators – and not to non-professional users like the AILD.

¹⁰ The dependence on the AIA is less of an issue for the PLD as it has greater harmonization and extensive case law. However, identifying the appropriate safety requirements (Articles 6 and 7) to assess the defectiveness of LLMs remains a challenge.

representing a metric for evaluating the fault of the designers and deployers (or the defectiveness of the same).

2.3. Disclosure of evidence

Both proposals state that the defendant — in our analysis, the deployers and designers of a Generative AI model — must provide evidence that is both relevant and proportionate to the claimant's presented facts and evidence. Shortcomings here concern the content of such disclosure. First, the PLD and the AIA are misaligned as the former requires evidence disclosure for all AI systems, whereas the AIA proposal mandates record-keeping obligations only for high-risk systems (Article 12, AIA) [13]. Regarding Generative AI, there is no blanket requirement for GPAI providers to continuously and automatically record events ('logging') throughout the model's lifecycle. The obligation to document and report significant incidents to the AI Office and national authorities is limited to models classified as systemically risky (Article 55, AIA). Providers of standard GPAI are required to maintain technical documentation related to training, testing, model evaluation outcomes, and proof of copyright law compliance. Yet, there is no directive for ongoing performance recording.

Second, both the PLD and the AILD do not indicate what type of information must be disclosed. While this issue can be attributed to their status as proposals, this gap should be promptly addressed. Failing to establish clear guidelines on the necessary disclosures might leave the claimants practically unprotected.

Regarding the first issue, the requirement to disclose evidence should not be confined to high-risk systems alone. The PLD could potentially adopt the AILD's approach, which broadens the disclosure requirement to include opaque systems that are not classified as high-risk while exempting those high-risk systems that already have ample documentation under the AIA (Article 4(4) and (5) AILD). This strategy could broaden the scope to include standard GPAI models, not just those systemically risky. This adjustment is reasonable, particularly since standard GPAI models typically process less data than their systemically risky counterparts and already face stringent transparency obligations that should facilitate the implementation of record-keeping practices. While the disclosure content might vary based on the system's risk level, maintaining the obligation to disclose is essential.

This leads us to the second point of discussion: the content of disclosure. It should include a report of the damaging incident, noting the exact time and briefly describing its nature. It might include interaction logs and timestamps between users and the GPAI model, demonstrating adherence to relevant standards, possibly verified through third-party audit reports [14]. Moreover, the disclosure should also mirror the sociotechnical structure of AI liability [15,16] and prove that training data are representative and well-documented, e.g., in terms of the motivation behind data selection and transparency about the objectives of data collection (Bender et al. 2021; Jo and Gebru 2020). Also, producers might be obligated to use only documentable datasets of an appropriate size for the organization's capabilities. For instance, LLMs operating on restricted datasets—thanks to their few/zero-shot learning skills [17]—may instead need to disclose the auxiliary information used for associating observed and non-observed classes of objects.

To conclude, the process of evidential disclosure presupposes that individuals are informed when they are engaging with these models and, consequently, whether they have been adversely affected in specific ways. However, even though the stipulations outlined in the AIA mandate the notification of users during interactions with GPAI models, the methodology for user notification remains ambiguous [18]. This is a key point as the efficacy of the disclosure mechanisms hinges on this prerequisite, wherein to lodge claims, users must possess a reasonable basis to suspect harm and furnish substantial details and corroborating

evidence to substantiate a potential damages claim. Since the acquisition of this knowledge can present challenges, it is recommended to encourage Generative AI producers to notify occurrences of potential harm actively. This strategy would not only bolster the claimant's ability to access crucial evidence but would also cultivate a more transparent environment within the operational sphere of Generative AI models. Such incentives might include initiatives like forming alliances with credible third-party organizations, including auditing agencies, to facilitate a thorough disclosure of information (and evidence) concerning adverse effects.

3. Privacy and data protection

Privacy and data protection pose critical legal hurdles to the development and deployment of Generative AI, as exemplified by the 2023 Italian data authority's (Garante della Privacy) temporary ban on ChatGPT and the following notice in January 2024 by the same authority to OpenAI that its ChatGPT chatbot allegedly violates the EU General Data Protection Regulation (see *infra* sub 7). Privacy and data protection are not binary variables, and, therefore, what is the proper context or the correct recipients of the information is a matter of debate. In the context of LLMs, these debates are further complicated due to the diverse purposes, applications, and environments they operate in. For this discussion, we will concentrate on strategies to prevent LLMs from compromising user privacy and personal data, bypassing what makes a context or a recipient. However, an analysis of these issues is done by [19].

Generative AI models may violate privacy and data protection laws due to pervasive training on (partially) personal data, the memorization of training data, inversion attacks [20], interactions with users (e.g., prompts containing personal data of third parties) [2, Technical Report, p. 2] [89], and the output the AI produces. Memorization of data may occur either through overfitting abundant parameters to small datasets, which reduces the capacity to generalize to new data, or through the optimizing generalization of long-tailed data distributions [21]. When the memorized training data contains personal information, LLMs may leak data and disclose it directly. When training data is not memorized, personal information can still be inferred or reconstructed by malicious actors using model inversion attacks, which reverse-engineer the input data to reveal private information [22]. Against this, the existing privacy-preserving strategies, such as data sanitization (the process of removing or modifying sensitive information from a dataset to protect privacy) and differential privacy (a mathematical framework for quantifying the privacy loss incurred by a data analysis algorithm), provide limited privacy protection when applied to LLMs [19]. This raises the question of whether and how personal data may be processed to train LLMs—a particularly thorny question concerning sensitive data. Moreover, users may enter private information through prompts, which may resurface in other instances. Some users, in addition, will be minors, for whom specific data protection rules apply.

Based on existing data protection proceedings¹¹ and literature [2,7,8,19,20,30,34,35,38,40,41,47,77,78,89], we can identify eight main

¹¹ See, e.g., Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, Provvedimento del 30 marzo 2023 [9870832]; Irish Data Protection Commission, The DPC's Engagement with Meta on AI, <https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/latest-news/dpcs-engagement-meta-ai> (June 14, 2024); noyb, ChatGPT provides false information about people, and OpenAI can't correct it, <https://noyb.eu/en/chatgpt-provides-false-information-about-people-and-openai-cant-correct-it> (April 29, 2024); see also *next fn*.

problems at the intersection of data protection and Generative AI:¹² the appropriate legal basis for AI training; the proper legal basis for processing prompts; information requirements; hallucinations and data accuracy; model inversion, data leakage, and the right to erasure; automated decision-making; protection of minors; and purpose limitation and data minimization. We analyse them first and then offer some thoughts on potential ways forward.

3.1. Legal basis for AI training on personal data

First and foremost, every processing operation of personal data – be it storage, transfer, copying, or else – needs a legal basis under Article 6 GDPR. For companies without an establishment in the EU, the GDPR still applies if their services are offered in the EU, for example, which is the case for many major LLM products. The GDPR also covers processing before the actual release of the model, i.e., for training purposes [23]. LLMs are typically trained on broad data at scale, with data sources ranging from proprietary information to everything available on the Internet—including personal data, i.e., data that can be related to an identifiable individual [10]. Using this type of data for AI training purposes, hence, is illegal under the GDPR unless a specific legal basis applies. The same holds for any fine-tuning operations after initial pre-training.

3.1.1. Consent and the balancing test

The most prominent legal basis in the GDPR is consent (Article 6(1)(a)). However, for large data sets, including personal information from a vast group of people unknown to the developers beforehand, eliciting valid consent from each individual is generally not an option due to prohibitive transaction costs [24]. Furthermore, using LLMs with web-scraped datasets and unpredictable applications is difficult to square with informed and specific consent [10], as the Dutch Data Protection Authority has also noted.¹³ Hence, for legal and economic reasons (transaction costs), AI training can be based only on the balancing test of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR [25], according to which processing “necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller” (i.e., the developing entity) justify processing unless they are “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject[s]” (i.e., the persons whose data are used).¹⁴

¹² This list is not exhaustive. For practitioners, particularly, the records of processing activities (Article 30 GDPR) and the data protection impact assessment (Article 35 GDPR) are very relevant as well. See, e.g., guidelines by the European Data Protection Board, Report of the work undertaken by the ChatGPT Taskforce, 23 May 2024, https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/other/report-work-undertaken-chatgpt-taskforce_en; German data protection authorities: Orientierungshilfe der Konferenz der unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder, 6 May 2024, Künstliche Intelligenz und Datenschutz, Version 1.0, https://www.datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/oh/20240506_DSK_Orientierungshilfe_KI_und_Datenschutz.pdf; the data protection checklist for AI issued by the Bavarian Data Protection Authority, 24 January 2024, https://www.lda.bayern.de/media/ki_checkliste.pdf; French data protection authority: Self-assessment guide for artificial intelligence (AI) systems, <https://www.cnil.fr/en/self-assessment-guide-artificial-intelligence-ai-systems>; UK Information Commissioner’s Office, Guidance on AI and Data Protection, 15 March 2023, <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/artificial-intelligence/guidance-on-ai-and-data-protection/>; Italian Data Protection Authority, Instructions against web scraping, 20 May 2024, <https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/10020316>.

¹³ Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, AP: scraping bijna altijd illegal, 1 May 2024, <https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/actueel/ap-scraping-bijna-altijd-illegaal>.

¹⁴ Another possibility is the purpose change test (Article 6(4) GDPR), not explored further here for space constraints. Note that Article 9 GDPR, in our view, applies in addition.

Whether the balancing test provides a legal basis is, unfortunately, a matter of case-by-case analysis [26–28]. Generally, particularly socially beneficial applications will speak in favour of developers or users; in addition, if the data subject could reasonably expect the use of the data for AI training purposes, this bolsters the controller’s legitimate interests (Rec. 47 GDPR). That latter criterion, however, will rarely be fulfilled. In addition, privacy-enhancing strategies, such as pseudonymization, differential privacy, transparency (e.g., of the processing operations, model architecture) or encryption (cf. Art. 25 GDPR), will count toward the legality of AI training under the balancing test. By contrast, the nature and scope of processing, the type of data (sensitive or not), the degree of transparency towards and control for data subjects, and other factors may tip the balance in the other direction.

For narrowly tailored AI models based on supervised learning strategies, one may argue that AI training is not particularly harmful as it does not, generally, reveal any new information about the data subjects themselves [29–31]. This argument is powerful if the model is not passed along to other entities and state-of-the-art IT security makes data breaches less likely; hacks and data breaches remain a threat, however, if storage time is extended for ML training.

However, such a benevolent position towards AI training is challenging to maintain with Generative AI. Millions of different actors generally use these models, and models have been shown to reveal personal data through data leakage and model inversion [20,32,33]. This poses an even greater challenge in fine-tuning scenarios [34]. This aligns with the Irish DPC’s recent concerns about AI training based on user data, which prompted Meta to stop this practice regarding EU users.¹⁵

3.1.2. Sensitive data

To make matters even more complex, a much larger number of personal data pieces than expected may be particularly protected as sensitive data under Article 9 GDPR under a recent ruling of the CJEU. In *Meta v. Bundeskartellamt*, the Grand Chamber of Court decided that information need not directly refer to protected categories—such as ethnic or racial origin, religion, age, or health—to fall under Article 9. Rather, it suffices “that data processing allows information falling within one of those categories to be revealed”.¹⁶ That case was decided concerning Meta, the parent company of Facebook, based on its vast collection of data tracking users and linking that data with the user’s Facebook account.

Arguably, however, as is generally the case in technology-neutral data protection law, the exact method of tracking or identification is irrelevant; the Court held that it does not matter, for example, whether the profiled person is a Facebook user or not.¹⁷ Rather, from the perspective of data protection law, what is decisive is the controller’s ability to infer sensitive traits based on the available data—irrespective of whether the operator intends to make that inference. This broader understanding casts a wide net for the applicability of Article 9 GDPR, as machine learning techniques increasingly allow for the deduction of protected categories from otherwise innocuous data points [35,36].

Hence, in many cases concerning big data formats, the hypothetical possibility to infer sensitive data potentially brings the processing, for example, for AI training purposes, under the ambit of Article 9. Developers must then avail themselves of the specific exception in Article 9(2) GDPR. Outside of explicit consent, such an exception will, however, often not be available: Article 9(2) does not contain a general balancing

¹⁵ Irish Data Protection Commission, The DPC’s Engagement with Meta on AI, <https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/latest-news/dpcs-engagement-meta-ai> (June 14, 2024).

¹⁶ CJEU, C-252/21, *Meta vs. Bundeskartellamt*, ECLI:EU:C:2023:537, para. 73.

¹⁷ CJEU, C-252/21, *Meta vs. Bundeskartellamt*, ECLI:EU:C:2023:537, para. 73.

test, in contrast to Article 6(1) GDPR (and the secondary use clause in Article 6(4)). The research exemption in Article 9(2)(j) GDPR, for example, is limited to building models for research purposes but cannot be used to exploit them commercially (cf. Recitals 159 and 162).

Overall, this discussion points to the urgent need to design a novel exemption to Article 9, accompanied by strong safeguards, similar to the ones contemplated in Article 10, point 5 of the AIA, to balance the societal interest in socially beneficial AI training and development with the protection of individual rights and freedoms, particularly in crucial areas such as medicine, education, or employment. While the TDM exception provides a specific framework for using copyrighted material for AI training purposes (see below, 4), such rules are, unfortunately, entirely lacking under the GDPR.

3.2. Legal basis for prompts containing personal data

The situation differs for prompts containing personal data entered into a trained model. Here, we have to distinguish two situations fundamentally. First, users may include personal information about themselves in prompts, for example, when they ask an LLM to draft an email concerning a specific event, appointment, or task. This may occur intentionally or inadvertently. In both cases, consent may indeed work as a legal basis as users have to register for the LLM product individually. During that procedure, controllers may request consent (respecting the conditions for valid consent under Articles 4(11) and 7 GDPR, of course).

The second scenario concerns prompts containing personal information about third parties, i.e., not the person entering the prompt. This situation is more common among users who might not be fully aware of privacy and data protection laws. They might inadvertently include the personal details of others if the task at hand involves these third parties, and they expect the language model to provide personalized responses. Users cannot, however, validly consent for another person (unless that person has explicitly mandated them to do just that, which is unlikely).

A similar problem resurfaces as in the AI training or fine-tuning scenario, with the additional twist that the information is provided and processing initiated by the user, not the developers. While the user may be regarded as the sole controller, or joint controller together with the company operating the LLM (Article 4(7) GDPR), for the initial storage and transfer of the prompt (i.e., writing and sending the prompt), any further memorization or data leakage is under the sole control of the entity operating the LLM. Hence, under the *Fashion ID* judgment of the CJEU,¹⁸ that operational entity will likely be considered the sole controller, and thus the responsible party (Art. 5(2) GDPR), for any storage, transfer, leakage, or other processing of the third-party-related personal data included in the prompt that occurs after the initial prompting by the user. Again, as in the training scenario, both the third-party-related prompt itself and any additional leakage or storage are difficult to justify under Article 6(1)(f) and, if applicable, Article 9 GDPR.

3.3. Information requirements

The following major roadblocks for GDPR-compliant Generative AI models are Articles 12–15 GDPR, which detail the obligations regarding the information that must be provided to data subjects. These articles pose a unique challenge for Generative AI due to the nature and scope of the data they process [2].

When considering data harvested from the internet for training purposes, the applicability of Article 14 of the GDPR is crucial. This article addresses the need for transparency when personal data is not directly collected from the individuals concerned. However, the feasibility of individually informing those whose data form part of the training set is often impractical due to the extensive effort required,

potentially exempting it under Article 14(5)(b) of the GDPR. Factors such as the volume of data subjects, the data's age, and implemented safeguards are significant in this assessment, as noted in Recital 62 of the GDPR. The Article 29 Working Party notes the impracticality when data is aggregated from numerous individuals, especially when contact details are unavailable (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2018, para. 63, example).

Conversely, the processing of personal data submitted by users on themselves in a chat interface (prompts) is not subject to such exemptions. Article 13 of the GDPR explicitly requires that data subjects be informed of several vital aspects, including processing purposes, the legal basis for processing, and any legitimate interests pursued. Current practices may not have fully addressed these requirements, marking a significant gap in GDPR compliance.

Importantly, the balance between the practical challenges of compliance and the rights of data subjects is delicate. While the concept of disproportionate effort under Article 14(5) GDPR presents a potential exemption, it remains a contentious point, particularly for training data scraping and processing for commercial purposes. In this regard, the data controller, as defined in Article 4(7) of the GDPR, should meticulously document the considerations made under this provision. This documentation is a crucial aspect of the accountability principle enshrined in Article 5(2) of the GDPR. Furthermore, in our view, documents regarding the methods of collecting training data should be made publicly accessible, reinforcing the commitment to GDPR principles.

3.4. Hallucinations and data accuracy

Data protection laws, such as the GDPR and the UK GDPR, lay down essential principles that govern the processing of personal data, including purpose limitation, storage limitation, and data minimization. Among these, the principle of data accuracy emerged at the forefront with the advent of generative AI technologies. Article 5(1)(d) of the GDPR stipulates that personal data must be accurate and updated. This presents significant challenges for generative AI, which, due to its reliance on probabilistic methods, is prone to generating content that is factually inaccurate or not faithful to the source provided—referred to as "hallucinations."¹⁹

These hallucinations can range from minor inaccuracies to significant falsehoods, such as erroneous statements about politicians and their agenda,²⁰ or deep fakes that suggest behaviours or statements that never occurred. The recent complaint filed by Max Schrems' NGO, noyb, against OpenAI to the Austrian Data Protection Authority²¹ highlights concerns about AI-generated inaccurate information, which could potentially violate the GDPR's accuracy principle.

While the accuracy principle is a cornerstone of data protection laws, it should not be viewed as absolute. Recital 39 of the GDPR emphasizes

¹⁹ The meaning of data accuracy under the GDPR should not be confused with accuracy in the AI Act. The GDPR's concept of accuracy, as outlined in Article 5(1)(d), refers specifically to ensuring that personal data is accurate, relevant, and kept up to date, reflecting correct information about the data subject. In contrast, the AI Act introduces a broader notion of "accuracy," which pertains to the performance of AI systems in generating correct outputs, whether related to personal data or not. This distinction is also reflected in the UK ICO guidance, which separates the GDPR's personal data accuracy obligations from the statistical accuracy of AI-generated outputs. The latter need not achieve perfect statistical precision as long as inaccuracies do not result in significant consequences for individuals.

²⁰ AlgorithmWatch, 'ChatGPT and Co: Are AI-driven search engines a threat to democratic elections?', October 5, 2023, <https://algorithmwatch.org/en/bing-chat-election-2023/>.

²¹ Noyb, ChatGPT provides false information about people, and OpenAI can't correct it, <https://noyb.eu/en/chatgpt-provides-false-information-about-people-and-openai-cant-correct-it> (April 29, 2024).

¹⁸ CJEU, C-40/17, *Fashion ID*, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629.

that personal data should be accurate and kept up to date, but it also recognizes the need for a proportionate approach to data processing. This implies that data protection must be balanced against other fundamental rights, including the rights of AI developers and providers to conduct their business effectively. Recital 39 acknowledges that data processing requirements, such as accuracy, should be applied in a manner that respects other rights and freedoms. As such, courts and data protection authorities may determine that not every instance of AI-generated inaccurate information necessitates correction. Instead, they may apply a *de minimis* threshold, requiring rectification only for significant inaccuracies that substantially impact individuals. This approach ensures that data accuracy obligations do not unduly hinder legitimate business operations or stifle innovation.

The UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) has guided on this matter, clarifying that the accuracy principle applies to both the input data fed into an AI system and the outputs it generates. "However," the ICO notes, "this does not mean that an AI system needs to be 100 % statistically accurate to comply with the accuracy principle. In many cases, the outputs of an AI system are not intended to be treated as factual information about the individual."²² Hence, minor inaccuracies, such as a wrong birthday date, may not constitute a breach of the accuracy principle unless they have significant consequences.

This approach would mirror legal precedents under tort law, such as the Autocomplete judgment by the German Federal Court of Justice.²³ In this case, the court ruled that a search engine provider could be held liable for suggestions generated by its autocomplete function if the company did not take reasonable steps to prevent suggestions that were defamatory or otherwise infringed on personality rights significantly.²⁴ Similarly, under the GDPR's accuracy principle, significant false information generated by AI—such as wrongly attributing a movie role to an actor or incorrect supposed statements of public interest (e.g., election contexts)—may require correction, especially when it impacts the individual's professional reputation or public record [90]. While new tools are being developed to detect hallucinations [91], they operate probabilistically and are unlikely to catch and remove all hallucinations in critical scenarios [91, p. 629].

In summary, while the accuracy principle remains a critical aspect of data protection in the context of Generative AI, its enforcement will likely focus on significant inaccuracies rather than demanding absolute correctness in all outputs. This balancing act aims to protect individuals from substantial harm while allowing some leeway in cases of minor inaccuracies. However, addressing even this more limited set of significant inaccuracies will be a challenging task for those developing and deploying large language models, as they must navigate the complexities of probabilistic systems that are inherently prone to generating errors.

3.5. Model inversion, data leakage, and the right to erasure

GDPR compliance for Generative AI models gets even trickier with concerns about reconstructing training data from the model (model inversion) and unintentional data leaks, especially in light of the right to be forgotten (or right to erasure) under Article 17. Some scholars even argue that LLMs themselves might be considered personal data due to their vulnerability to these attacks [37,92]. Inversion attacks refer to techniques whereby, through specific strategies, individuals' data used in the training of these models can be extracted or inferred. Similarly, the memorization problem, which causes LLMs to output personal data contained in the training data potentially, may be invoked to qualify LLMs themselves as personal data.

The Hamburg Data Protection Authority's recent guidance claims that LLMs are generally not classified as personal data based on a particular reading of the CJEU's Breyer case.²⁵ However, this non-binding document does not close the discussion. While some commentators agree with the Hamburg guidance [93], in our view, LLMs can be compared to compressed and encrypted data. As such, they may still be considered personal data under certain circumstances. Under the Breyer case, three elements are essential:²⁶ First, there must be a method to technically link the information in the model (i.e., tensors containing weights and biases) to a specific person. If such a method exists (e.g., via model inversion, membership inference or memorization attacks), it effectively functions as a key to decipher personal data embedded in the model.

Second, however, if the controller is unlikely to use this method, the LLM will not be classified as personal data under the GDPR concerning that controller. Internal use policies and technical restrictions are crucial here.

Finally, there is debate over whether the re-identification method's legality affects its classification. The Hamburg DPA argues that if the technique is illegal, the LLM cannot be considered personal data. This interpretation, however, is not universally accepted and remains subject to further legal scrutiny [30, p. 265 et seqq.]. Ultimately, it would be wrong to deny the protection of the GDPR precisely in cases of illegal attacks. Hence, even illegal re-identification scenarios must be factored in as a data protection risk, in our view.

The ramifications of classifying the model as personal data are profound and far-reaching. If an LLM is indeed deemed personal data, a legal basis is needed for even using or downloading the model. Furthermore, such a qualification implies that data subjects could, in theory, invoke their right to erasure under Article 17 of the GDPR concerning the entire model. This right, also known as the 'right to be forgotten,' allows individuals to request the deletion of their personal data under specific conditions. In the context of LLMs, this could lead to unprecedented demands for the deletion of the model itself, should it be established that the model contains or constitutes personal data of the individuals.

Such a scenario poses significant challenges for AI and machine learning. The practicality of complying with a request for erasure in this context is fraught with technical and legal complexities [38,39]. Deleting a model, particularly one that has been widely distributed or deployed, could be technologically challenging and may have significant implications for the utility and functionality of the corresponding AI system. Furthermore, this approach raises questions about the balance between individual rights and the broader benefits of AI technologies. Deleting entire models, with a potential subsequent economic need to retrain the whole model, also conflicts with environmental sustainability given the enormous energy and water consumption of (re-)training LLMs.

Although LLM producers, such as OpenAI, claim to comply with the right to erasure, it is unclear how they can do so because personal information may be contained in multiple forms in an LLM, which escalates the complexity of identifying and isolating specific data points, mainly when the data is not presented in a structured format (e.g., phone numbers). Additionally, the removal requests initiated by a single data subject may prove inadequate, especially in scenarios where multiple users have circulated identical information during their engagements with the LLM [19]. In other words, deleting data from a training dataset represents a superficial solution, as it does not necessarily obliterate the potential for data retrieval or the extraction of associated information encapsulated within the model's parameters. Data incorporated during the training phase can permeate the outputs generated by certain

²² ICO, Guidance on AI and Data Protection, 2023, 39.

²³ BGH, Case VI ZR 269/12, May 14, 2013, <https://dejure.org/ext/9dffd24f77d5452f7240244790c24e2>.

²⁴ BGH, Case VI ZR 269/12, May 14, 2013, para. 36.

²⁵ <https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/news/hamburger-thesen-zum-personenbezug-in-large-language-models> (July 15, 2024).

²⁶ CJEU, Judgment of 19 October 2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer.

machine learning models, creating a scenario where original training data, or information linked to the purged data, can be inferred or "leaked," thereby undermining the integrity of the deletion process and perpetuating potential privacy violations [40]. At a minimum, this points to the need for more robust and comprehensive strategies to address data privacy and "machine unlearning" [41–43] within the operational area of LLMs.

3.6. Automated decision-making

Furthermore, given new CJEU jurisprudence, Generative AI models might be qualified as automated decision-making processes, a topic scrutinized under Article 22 of the GDPR. This article generally prohibits automated individual decision-making, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning an individual or similarly significantly affects them, unless specific exceptions apply.

In cases where LLMs are used for evaluation, such as in recruitment or credit scoring, the importance of this regulation becomes even more significant. A pertinent illustration is provided by the recent ruling in the SCHUFA case by the CJEU.²⁷ The Court determined that the automated generation of a probability value regarding an individual's future ability to payment commitments by a credit information agency constitutes 'automated individual decision-making' as defined in Article 22. According to the Court, this presupposes, however, that this probability value significantly influences a third party's decision to enter into, execute, or terminate a contractual relationship with that individual.

Extrapolating from this ruling, the automated evaluation or ranking of individuals by LLMs will constitute automated decision-making if it is paramount for the decision at hand—even if a human signs off on it afterwards. The legal implications of this judgment are profound. Exemptions from the general prohibition of such automated decision-making are limited to scenarios where a specific law allows the process, explicit consent, or where the automated processing is necessary for contractual purposes, as per Article 22(2) of the GDPR.

Obtaining valid consent in these contexts is challenging, especially considering the power imbalances often present between entities like employers or credit agencies and individuals seeking jobs or credit (Recital 43 GDPR). Therefore, the legality of using LLMs in such situations may largely depend on whether their use can be justified as necessary for the specific task at hand (Article 22(2)(a) GDPR). Arguments based solely on efficiency are unlikely to be sufficient. Instead, those deploying LLMs for such purposes might need to demonstrate tangible benefits to the applicants, such as more reliable, less biased, or more transparent evaluation processes. Absent such a qualification, only specific union or Member State laws containing sufficient safeguards may permit such automated decision making (Article 22(2)(b) GDPR).

3.7. Protection of minors

The deployment of Generative AI models has raised significant concerns regarding age-appropriate content, especially given the potential for generating outputs that may not be suitable for minors. Under Article 8(2) GDPR, the controller must undertake "reasonable efforts to verify [...] that [children's] consent is given or authorized by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology."

A notable instance of regulatory intervention in this context is the action taken by the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali—GPDP). On March 30, 2023, the GPDP imposed a temporary restriction on OpenAI's processing of data from Italian users, with a particular emphasis on safeguarding minors.²⁸ This

move underscores the increasing scrutiny by data protection authorities on the implications of LLMs in protecting vulnerable groups, especially children [44].

In response to these concerns, OpenAI, for example, has implemented measures aimed at enhancing the protection of minors. These include the establishment of an age gate and the integration of age verification tools. The effectiveness and robustness of these tools, however, remain an area of keen interest and ongoing evaluation, especially in the rapidly evolving landscape of AI and data protection.

3.8. Purpose limitation and data minimization

Data controllers should collect personal data only as relevant and necessary for a specific purpose (Article 5(b)-(c), GDPR). The AIA reflects this, requiring an assessment of data quantity and suitability (Article 10(2)(e)). However, limiting Generative AI models' undefined range of purposes, which need extensive data for effective training, might be counterproductive. This restriction might hinder their effectiveness in real-world scenarios that are often dynamic and varied. Generative AI models possess a strong adaptability, enabling them to be repurposed for tasks beyond their initial design. This flexibility is a crucial driver of innovation in the field. Purpose limitation could stifle this potential, preventing the discovery of novel applications.

One approach to address data calibration for open-ended LLM applications requires developers to train models on smaller datasets and leverage few/zero-shot learning skills. As an alternative to imposing restrictions on the dataset, however, it could be more beneficial to strengthen privacy-preserving measures proportionally to dataset size. As the size and complexity of datasets used by Large Language Model (LLM) providers continue to grow, it becomes increasingly important to strengthen privacy-preserving measures to protect individuals' data from potential breaches. Traditional methods, such as pseudo-anonymization and encryption, though valuable, may not be sufficient on their own, especially in the context of large datasets where adversarial attacks can exploit subtle patterns in data to re-identify individuals or extract sensitive information. The AI Act's reference to these methods under Article 10(5)(b) highlights their importance but also suggests the need for more robust techniques. Differential privacy emerges as a powerful tool [46,47]. It offers a mathematically grounded approach to safeguarding privacy by ensuring that the inclusion or exclusion of any single data point does not significantly affect the output of an analysis, thereby protecting individuals' identities even in large datasets.

Differential privacy works by introducing carefully calibrated noise to the data, which effectively obscures any individual's information while still allowing for meaningful insights to be drawn from the dataset as a whole. This method is particularly well-suited to large datasets, where the potential for re-identification or privacy breaches is heightened due to the volume of information and the complexity of patterns that advanced algorithms can detect. By implementing differential privacy, LLM providers can mitigate the risk of adversarial attacks that seek to uncover personal data, thus enhancing the overall security of the dataset. This not only aligns with the privacy requirements outlined in regulations like GDPR and the AI Act but also potentially builds trust with users by ensuring that their data is handled with a high standard of data protection, regardless of the dataset's size.

3.9. Ways forward

To enable Generative AI models to comply with GDPR data protection standards, we have already suggested a tailored regime under Art. 9 (2) GDPR above. Another reasonable step would be to adapt the data governance measures outlined for high-risk systems in the AIA. The European Parliament had made a proposal for an Article 28(b), which would have delineated the following obligations for GPAI providers from the European Parliament's perspective: "process and incorporate

²⁷ CJEU, C-634/21, QG vs. SCHUFA, ECLI:EU:C:2023:957, para. 73.

²⁸ Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, Provvedimento del 30 marzo 2023 [9870832].

only datasets that are subject to appropriate data governance measures [...] in particular measures to examine the suitability of the data sources and possible biases and appropriate mitigation". However, this proposal has not made it into the final version of the AI Act; rather, if used in specific high-risk scenarios, GPAIs will fall under the data governance rules of Article 10.

While the revised iteration of the compromise text for Article 10 is extensive, it may also be too generic, necessitating the incorporation of more tailored measures or incentives to aptly address the complexities inherent to GPAI models like LLMs (e.g., under harmonized standards and typical specifications, Art. 40 and 41 AIA). These technical standards should be refined by incorporating LLM-specific measures, such as requiring training on publicly available data, wherever possible. A significant portion of these datasets might also take advantage of GDPR's right to be forgotten exceptions for public interest, scientific, and historical research (Article 17(3)(d)). Where these exceptions do not apply, it could be feasible for LLMs to use datasets not contingent upon explicit consent, which are intended for public usage. Hence, the most appropriate way to use these systems could require fine-tuning public data with private information for individual data subjects' local use. This should be allowed to maximize LLMs' potential, as proposed by [19].

Other potential strategies to enhance data privacy are encouraging the proper implementation of the opt-out right by LLM providers and employers and exploring the potential of machine unlearning (MU) techniques, as mentioned.

Regarding the first strategy, OpenAI has recently made a potentially significant advancement in this direction by releasing a web crawler named GPTbot that comes with an opt-out feature for website owners. This feature enables them to deny access to the crawler, as well as customize or filter accessible content, granting them control over the content that the crawler interacts with.²⁹ This is useful not only for implementing the opt-out right under the EU TDM copyright exception but also under Article 21 GDPR.

Turning to the second strategy, MU stands as potentially a more efficient method to implement the right to erasure entirely [42], a critical aspect when dealing with LLMs. Unlike conventional methods that merely remove or filter data from a training set — a process often inadequate since the removed data continues to linger in the model's parameters — MU focuses on erasing the specific influence of certain data points on the model without the need for complete retraining. This technique, therefore, could more effectively enhance both individual and group privacy when using LLMs.

One of the primary advantages of MU is its ability to better comply with data protection regulations, such as the GDPR's right to erasure, by ensuring that personal data is genuinely removed from the AI system. This can also lead to greater trust and confidence among users that their data can be entirely erased when requested. However, the technique also faces significant challenges. Implementing MU is technically complex, as it requires sophisticated algorithms to accurately identify and remove the influence of specific data points without compromising the overall performance and integrity of the model. Additionally, there is the potential for residual data effects to persist if the unlearning process is not perfectly executed. Moreover, MU may not be universally applicable to all models or data, and there could be trade-offs between achieving complete unlearning and maintaining model accuracy. Despite these challenges, MU holds promise as a forward-looking strategy for improving data privacy in AI systems, but it will require ongoing research and refinement to realize its potential and address its limitations fully.

²⁹ However, skepticism about opting-out tools has raised because, for example, individual users opting-out are not the only holder of their sensitive information.

4. Intellectual property

Next to data protection concerns, Generative AI presents various legal challenges related to its "creative" outputs. Specifically, contents generated by LLMs result from processing text data such as websites, textbooks, newspapers, scientific articles, and programming codes. Viewed through the lens of intellectual property (IP) law, using LLMs raises various theoretical and practical issues³⁰ that can only be briefly touched upon in this paper and that the EU legislation seems not yet fully equipped to address. Even the most advanced piece of legislation currently under consideration by the EU institutions — the AIA — does not contain qualified answers to the issues that will be outlined below. The stakes have been raised significantly, however, by several high-profile lawsuits levelled by content creators (e.g., the New York Times; Getty Images) against Generative AI developers, both in the US³¹ and in the EU [45].

Within the context of this article, it is advisable to distinguish between the training of LLMs and the subsequent generation of outputs. Furthermore, concerning the generation of outputs, it is worthwhile to differentiate further — as suggested, among the others, by the European Parliament³² — between instances in which LLMs serve as mere instruments to enhance human creativity and situations in which LLMs operate with a significantly higher degree of autonomy. On the contrary, the possibility of protecting LLMs themselves through an IP right will not be discussed in this paper.

4.1. Training

The main copyright issue concerning AI training arises from the possibility that the training datasets may consist of or include text or other materials protected by copyright or related rights [46]. Indeed, for text and materials to be lawfully reproduced (or otherwise used within the training process), the right holders must give their permission, or the law must specifically allow their use in LLM training.

The extensive scale of the datasets used and, consequently, the significant number of right holders potentially involved render it exceedingly difficult to envision the possibility that those training LLMs could seek (and obtain) an explicit license from all right holders, structurally reproducing the problem of data protection consent (transaction costs). This issue becomes particularly evident when, as often occurs, LLM training is carried out using web scraping techniques, a practice whose legality has been (and continues to be) debated by courts and scholars in Europe [47,48], even in terms of potential infringement of the *sui generis* right granted to the maker of a database by Directive 96/9/EC.³³ On the one hand, some content available online, including texts and images, might be subject to permissive licensing conditions—e.g. some Creative Commons licenses—authorizing reproduction and reuse of such content even for commercial purposes. The owner of a website could, on the other hand, include contractual clauses in the Terms and Conditions of the website that prohibit web scraping even when all or some of the website's content is not *per se* protected by intellectual property rights.³⁴

³⁰ For a general discussion of these issues, see (J.-A. Lee, Hilty, and Liu 2021) and the compendium provided by WIPO, *Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence*, 21 May 2020, WIPO/IP/AI/2/GE/20/1 REV.

³¹ See, e.g., <https://www.bakerlaw.com/services/artificial-intelligence-ai/cas-e-tracker-artificial-intelligence-copyrights-and-class-actions/>.

³² Cf. European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 on intellectual property rights for the development of artificial intelligence technologies, 2020/2015(INI), par. 15.

³³ Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases ("Database Directive"), OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20 – 28.

³⁴ As clarified by the Court of Justice of the EU in the *Ryanair* case: CJEU, 15 January 2015, case C-30/14 – *Ryanair*, ECLI:EU:C:2015:10.

To mitigate legal risk, LLMs should be suitably capable of autonomously analysing website Terms and Conditions, thereby discerning between materials whose use has not been expressly reserved by their rightsholders and materials that may be freely used (also) for training purposes.

OpenAI above's GPTbot web crawler, which allows website owners to opt out or filter/customize content access, offers a technical tool in this context. Despite the opt-out option, many site owners are wary of the potential misuse of their data, particularly given the widespread blocking of GPTBot by major websites like The New York Times.³⁵ There are also concerns about the effectiveness of these controls, especially as AI crawlers become more sophisticated and might disguise themselves to bypass restrictions.³⁶ While crawlers with opt-outs do not eliminate all IP law concerns, they are a proactive measure that could, in the future, set a standard of care that all LLMs' providers might be expected to uphold.³⁷ Significantly, the GPAI rules of the AIA contain precisely an obligation for providers of such systems to establish a compliance system, via technical and organizational measures, capable of recognizing and respecting rightholders' opt-outs (Art. 53(1)(c) AI Act). This constitutes a step in the right direction, as commercial LLM training without such a compliance system typically amounts to systematic copyright infringement, even under the new and permissive EU law provisions to which we now turn.

A potential regulatory solution to ensure the lawful use of training datasets would involve applying the text and data mining (TDM) exception provided by Directive 2019/790/EU (DSMD)³⁸ to train LLMs. Indeed, Article 2(2) DSMD defines text and data mining as "any automated analytical technique aimed at analysing text and data in digital form to generate information which includes but is not limited to patterns, trends and correlations". Considering that the training of LLMs certainly encompasses (although it likely extends beyond) automated analysis of textual and data content in digital format to generate information, an argument could be made that such activity falls within the definition provided by the DSM Directive [49]. However, applying the TDM exception in the context of LLMs training raises non-trivial issues, as we now discuss [29,50–52].

Firstly, where the TDM activity is not carried out by research organizations and cultural heritage institutions for scientific research—e.g., by private companies and/or for commercial purposes—it is permitted under Article 4(3) DSMD only on condition that the use of works and other protected materials "has not been expressly reserved by their right-holders in an appropriate manner, such as machine-readable means in the case of content made publicly available online". This condition underscores our earlier note on needing LLMs to automatically analyse the Terms and Conditions of websites and online databases.

Secondly, a further element of complexity is that Article 4(2) DSMD stipulates that the reproductions and extractions of content made under Article 4(1) may only be retained "for as long as is necessary for the purposes of text and data mining". In this sense, if one interprets the TDM exception to merely cover the training phase of LLMs (as separate from the validation and testing phases), LLMs should delete copyrighted content used during training immediately after its use. Consequently,

these materials could not be employed to validate or test LLMs. In this perspective, to make the text and data mining exception more effective in facilitating LLM development, it is advisable to promote a broad normative interpretation of "text and data mining", encompassing not only the training activity in the strict sense but also the validation and testing of the LLM.

Thirdly, the exception covers only reproductions and extractions but not content modifications – which will often be necessary to bring the material into a format suitable for AI training. Finally, according to Article 7(2) DSMD, the three-step test [51] in Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC restricts the scope of the TDM exception. According to this general limit to copyright exceptions, contained as well in international treaties [53], such exceptions apply only "in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder." Importantly, this suggests that the TDM exception cannot justify reproductions that lead to applications that substitute or otherwise significantly economically compete with the protected material used for AI training. However, this is, arguably, precisely what many applications are doing [54]. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the three-step test limits individual applications of the TDM exception in concrete cases before the courts, as opposed to being a general constraint on Member States' competence to curtail the ambit of copyright [53, pp. 3–4].

As mentioned, legal proceedings have recently been brought in the United States and the EU to contest copyright infringement related to materials used in the training phase by AI systems.³⁹ While the outcomes of such cases are not necessarily predictive of how analogous cases might be resolved in the EU—for example, in the US, the fair use doctrine could be invoked [55], which lacks exact equivalents in the legal systems of continental Europe—it will be intriguing to observe the approach taken by courts across the Atlantic. Note, particularly, that these cases may, among other things, be decided by the extent to which AI systems substitute for, i.e., compete with, the materials they were trained on (so-called transformativeness, see, e.g. [56], a consideration that parallels the debate mentioned above in EU law on the interpretation of the three-step-test (and its transposition into Member State law [53, pp. 3–4]).

4.2. Output generation

It is now worth focusing on the legal issues raised by the generation of outputs by LLMs. In this regard, two different aspects must be primarily addressed: the legal relationship between these outputs and the materials used during the training of LLMs and the possibility of granting copyright or patent protection to these outputs.

As for the first aspect, it is necessary to assess whether LLM-generated outputs (a) give rise to the potential infringement of intellectual property rights in the pre-existing materials, (b) qualify as derivative creations based on the pre-existing materials, or (c) can be regarded as autonomous creations, legally independent from the pre-existing materials.

An answer to this complex legal issue could hardly be provided in general and abstract terms, requiring proceeding with a case-by-case assessment, i.e., by comparing a specific LLM-generated output with one or more specific pre-existing materials. Such a comparison could, in principle, be conducted by applying the legal doctrines currently

³⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/aug/25/new-york-times-cnn-and-abc-block-openais-gptbot-web-crawler-from-scraping-content>.

³⁶ <https://the-decoder.com/aws-investigates-perplexity-ai-for-potential-terms-of-service-violations-related-to-unauthorized-crawling/>.

³⁷ B. Kinsella "What is GPTBot and Why You Want OpenAI's New Web Crawler to Index Your Content" blogpost in Synthedia available at: https://synthedia.substack.com/p/what-is-gptbot-and-why-you-want-openais?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2.

³⁸ Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC ("Digital Single Market Directive"), OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92 – 125.

³⁹ See, e.g., Z. Small, "Sarah Silverman Sues OpenAI and Meta Over Copyright Infringement", The New York Times, 10 July 2023, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/arts/sarah-silverman-lawsuit-openai-meta.html>; B. Brittain, "Lawsuit says OpenAI violated US authors' copyrights to train AI chatbot", Reuters, 29 June 2023, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/legal/lawsuit-says-openai-violated-us-authors-copyrights-train-ai-chatbot-2023-06-29/>.

adopted by courts in cases of copyright or patent infringement (or, when appropriate, the legal doctrines adopted to assess whether a certain work/invention qualifies as a derivative work/invention). In this perspective, indeed, the circumstance that the output is generated by a human creator or an AI system does not make a significant legal distinction except in terms of identifying the subject legally accountable for copyright infringement.

In general terms, however, the use of protected materials in the training of an LLM does not imply, *per se*, that the LLM-generated outputs infringe upon the intellectual property rights in these materials⁴⁰ or qualify as derivative creations thereof. Broadly speaking, an LLM-generated output could infringe upon legal rights in two main ways. First, if the output exhibits substantial and direct similarities to legally protected elements of pre-existing materials, it would likely violate the (reproduction) rights of those materials. Second, if the legally protected aspects or elements of the pre-existing materials appear in the LLM output through indirect adaptations or modifications, always unauthorized, then this output would likely qualify as a derivative creation from the pre-existing materials [56,57]. For instance, the fact that a text generated by an LLM shares the same style as the works of a specific author (as would occur if a prompt such as “write a novel in the style of Dr. Seuss” were used) would not imply, *per se*, an infringement of the intellectual property rights of that author. This is because, in most European legal systems, the literary or artistic style of an author is not an aspect upon which an exclusive right can be claimed.

If, by contrast, an infringement is found in an LLM output, the person prompting the LLM would first and foremost be liable because she directly brings the reproduction into existence. However, LLM developers might, ultimately, also be liable. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently determined that if platforms fail to comply with any of three distinct duties of care, they will be directly accountable for violations of the right to communicate a work publicly.⁴¹ These duties amount to i) expeditiously deleting it or blocking access to infringing uploads of which the platform has specific knowledge; ii) putting in place the appropriate technological measures that can be expected from a reasonably diligent operator in its situation to counter credibly and effectively copyright infringements if the platform knows or ought to know, in a general sense, that users of its platform are making protected content available to the public illegally via its platform; iii) not providing tools on its platform specifically intended for the illegal sharing of such content and not knowingly promoting such sharing, including by adopting a financial model that encourages users of its platform illegally to communicate protected content.⁴² These duties could—*mutatis mutandis*—be transposed to LLM developers concerning the right of reproduction [58], although such transposition may not be so straightforward. However, this would make good sense, both from a normative perspective encouraging active prevention of copyright infringement and from the perspective of the coherence of EU copyright law across technical facilities.⁴³

A distinct and further legal issue arises when an LLM-generated output can be regarded as an autonomous creation, legally independent from the pre-existing materials. In this scenario, the question pertains to whether such output may be eligible for protection under IP law,

specifically through copyright (in the case of literary, artistic, or scientific works) or through patent protection (in the case of an invention) [48,59–61].

The fundamental legal problem here stems from the anthropocentric stance of intellectual property law. While international treaties and EU law do not explicitly state that the author or inventor must be human, various normative hints seem to support this conclusion. In the context of copyright, for instance, for a work to be eligible for protection, it must be original, i.e., it must constitute an author’s intellectual creation.⁴⁴ This requirement is typically interpreted, also by the Court of Justice of the EU, as the work needed to reflect the author’s personality (something that AI lacks, at least for now). Patent law takes a less marked anthropocentric approach, but even here, the so-called inventive step—which, together with novelty and industrial applicability, is required for an invention to be patentable—is normatively defined in terms of non-obviousness to a person skilled in the art.⁴⁵ The very existence of moral rights (such as the so-called right of paternity) safeguarding the author’s or inventor’s personality suggests that the subject of protection can only be human.

Given these brief considerations, we can return to the initial question, namely whether an LLM-generated output may be eligible for protection under intellectual property law.

The answer to this question is relatively straightforward when the LLM constitutes a mere instrument in the hands of a human creator, or, to put it differently, when the creative outcome is the result of predominantly human intellectual activity, albeit assisted or enhanced by an AI system. In such a scenario, the European Parliament has stressed that where AI is used only as a tool to help an author in the process of creation, the current IP framework remains fully applicable.⁴⁶ Indeed, as far as copyright protection is concerned, the Court of Justice of the EU has made clear in the *Painer* case⁴⁷ that it is certainly possible to create copyright-protected works with the aid of a machine or device. A predominant human intellectual activity can be recognized, also based on the CJEU case law, when the human creator using an LLM makes free and creative choices in the phases of conception, execution, and/or redaction of the work [62].

A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the patent protection of inventive outcomes generated with the support of an LLM [59]. In this perspective, as noted by some scholars, it would likely be necessary to adopt a broader interpretation of the inventive step requirement, which should be understood in terms of non-obviousness to a person skilled in the art assisted by AI, i.e., an AI-aided human expert [63,64].

An opposite conclusion is often reached when the LLM operates substantially autonomously. For clarity, it is necessary to explain the meaning of “autonomous” in this context [65]. Obviously, in the current state of technology, some degree of human intervention—at the very least in the form of prompts—will always be necessary for an LLM to generate any output. However, the mere formulation of a prompt by a human being is likely insufficient to recognize a substantial human contribution to the creative output generated by the LLM. The fundamental legal aspect is that a notable human contribution must be discernible not in the broader creative process but specifically in the resulting creative outcome. This condition is not met when human intervention merely

⁴⁰ However, some cases might pose more challenges than others: consider, e.g., the case where an AI system is used to create works that involve existing fictional characters (who are *per se* protected).

⁴¹ CJEU, Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18, *YouTube vs. Cyando*, ECLI:EU:C:2021:503.

⁴² CJEU, Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18, *YouTube vs. Cyando*, ECLI:EU:C:2021:503, para. 102. The latter point addresses specifically piracy platforms, not YouTube (para. 96 and 101).

⁴³ In his case, one would further have to investigate if Art. 17 DSMD constitutes a *lex specialis* to the more general *Cyando* case (Geiger and Jütte 2021; Leistner 2020).

⁴⁴ Cf. Art. 3(1) of the Database Directive; Art. 6 of the Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (“Term Directive”), OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 12 – 18; Art. 1(3) of the Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16 – 22.

⁴⁵ Cf. Art. 56 of the European Patent Convention.

⁴⁶ Cf. European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 on intellectual property rights for the development of artificial intelligence technologies, 2020/2015(INI), par. 15.

⁴⁷ CJEU, 1 December 2011, case C-145/10, *Painer*, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798.

involves providing a prompt to an LLM or even when minor modifications, legally insignificant, are made to the creative outcome generated by the LLM (e.g., minor editing of an LLM-generated text). By contrast, a level of IP protection might be appropriate for significant modifications made to the text produced by the LLM.

The conclusion above, which argues against copyright or patent protection for contents generated by LLMs in a substantially autonomous manner, finds confirmation in the positions taken on this issue by, e.g., the US Copyright Office,⁴⁸ affirmed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,⁴⁹ and the European Patent Office.⁵⁰ Furthermore, such a conclusion is consistent with the fundamental rationale of intellectual property of promoting and protecting human creativity, as also reflected at the normative level.⁵¹

However, some authors have observed (sometimes with critical undertones) that a rationale for protecting LLMs autonomously generated content is the need to protect investments made by individuals and/or organizations aimed at bringing creative products to the market [51,66,67].

In this case, the further issue of determining to whom such intellectual property rights should be granted emerges. Some national legislations—not coincidentally following the common law tradition, which exhibits a less pronounced anthropocentric character compared to civil law tradition—acknowledge the possibility of protecting computer-created works [68]—i.e. works “generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work,”⁵²—granting the copyright to the person “by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken”.⁵³ The identity of such a person, however, remains somewhat unclear, as this could be, depending on the circumstances, the developer of the LLM, its trainer, or its user, possibly even jointly [69].

In civil law systems, while awaiting a potential *ad hoc* regulatory intervention, a possible solution could involve applying to LLM-generated outputs the same principle that applies to works and inventions created by an employee within the scope of an employment contract. In such cases, in most EU legal systems, copyright or patent rights are vested in the employer. Similarly, in situations where the “employee” is artificial, the intellectual property right could be granted to the user of an LLM during entrepreneurial endeavours [70].

5. Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is a complex and, in the current geopolitical environment marked by armed and non-armed conflicts in many parts of the world, increasingly urgent matter. The EU has tackled this area with a range of instruments and provisions that apply, to varying degrees, to Generative AI models, too.

⁴⁸ On 16 March 2023 the US Copyright Office issued formal guidance on the registration of AI-generated works, confirming that “copyright can protect only material that is the product of human creativity”: see Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 51, March 16, 2023, Rules and Regulations, p. 16191.

⁴⁹ United States District Court for the District of Columbia [2023]: *Thaler v. Perlmutter*, No. 22-CV-384-1564-BAH.

⁵⁰ On 21 December 2021 the Legal Board of Appeal of the EPO issued a decision in case J 8/20 (DABUS), confirming that under the European Patent Convention (EPC) an inventor designated in a patent application must be a human being.

⁵¹ Cf. recital no. 10 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.

⁵² Cf. Sec. 178 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“CDP Act”).

⁵³ Cf. Sec. 9(3) of the CDP Act. Similarly, Sec. 11 of the 1997 Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 528) of Hong Kong and Art. 2 of the 1994 New Zealand Copyright Act.

5.1. The cyber resilience act and the AI act

While the GDPR, in Art. 32, does mandate state-of-the-art cybersecurity measures for any personal data processing; this provision does not, at least not easily, apply to industrial data [71] – which is often the target of cyberattacks, however.

This gap is supposed to be filled by the Cyber-Resilience Act (CRA), recently approved by the EU Parliament. It introduces cybersecurity measures for digital products across Europe. Targeting both hardware and software, the act mandates that Products with Digital Elements (PDEs) adhere to specific cybersecurity standards from design to deployment. A PDE is ‘a software or hardware product and its remote data processing solutions, including software or hardware components being placed on the market separately’ (Article 3(1) CRA). Hence, AI systems will generally constitute PDEs to the extent that they are placed on the market in the EU.

The CRA establishes a comprehensive framework to bolster cybersecurity measures across the European Union. It introduces a staggered approach to securing PDEs, starting with Article 6, which mandates that all PDEs must meet basic cybersecurity requirements to enter the EU market. These *essential requirements* are outlined in Annex I of the CRA and adopt a risk-based methodology. They encompass a wide range of measures, including conducting cybersecurity risk assessments to eliminate known vulnerabilities, implementing exploration and mitigation systems, ensuring security by default, providing cybersecurity updates automatically, protecting against unauthorized access, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data, requiring incident reporting, and maintaining resilience against DDoS attacks. Additionally, it necessitates ongoing responsibilities throughout the product’s lifecycle, such as promptly addressing emerging vulnerabilities, conducting regular security testing, and disseminating security patches swiftly.

For products deemed as ‘important PDEs,’ Article 7 stipulates that they must adhere to more stringent requirements, including undergoing *conformity assessments*. This classification is determined based on a specified list in Annex III, which includes important components like operating systems, browsers, personal information management systems, cybersecurity-related systems, and password managers. Integrating AI in any of these listed products automatically subjects the AI models to these enhanced cybersecurity protocols, ensuring a robust defence mechanism against potential cyber threats.

‘Critical PDEs,’ under the scrutiny of Article 8, are required to implement *substantial cybersecurity* measures. The CRA empowers the Commission to designate what constitutes a critical PDE through delegated acts, referencing an exhaustive list of products integral to cybersecurity infrastructure, such as hardware devices with security boxes, smart meter gateways, and smart cards. Using AI within these specified settings mandates compliance with the substantial cybersecurity framework. This constitutes the highest security level; however, Member States may establish even more stringent obligations for products used in national security or defence. The CRA’s dynamic structure, allowing for the updating of Annexes by the Commission, ensures that the legislative framework can, at least in theory, adapt to the rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape and technological advancements.

Although it broadly encompasses AI systems under the category of PDEs, the CRA specifically delineates targeted requirements for high-risk AI systems per the classification outlined in the AIA (Article 8 CRA). To obtain a declaration of conformity, such products must comply with the CRA’s essential requirements as detailed in Annex I. As mentioned, this encompasses a range of measures; data processing should be limited strictly to what is necessary for the product’s intended purpose, emphasizing data minimization.

Hence, the CRA does not explicitly address Generative AI or LLMs. This gap likely stems from the CRA’s alignment with an earlier version of the AIA that did not encompass Generative AI or LLMs. Yet, interpreting the CRA legislator’s intent as if they wanted to specifically target the most potentially hazardous AI systems through Article 8 and Annex I and

to maintain systemic coherence within the EU legal framework — especially in alignment with the AIA — it becomes evident that the CRA may benefit from adjustments to explicitly encompass Generative AI and align it with the requirements in the AI Act.

Adapting the CRA to include Generative AI explicitly should be straightforward. The AIA has already laid down a risk-tiered classification and specific regulations for Generative AI (i.e., GPAI). This pre-existing framework offers a clear pathway for incorporating Generative AI into the CRA, potentially through the European Commission's delegated acts. Such integration would enhance the CRA's effectiveness in governing AI technologies and align it more closely with the evolving landscape of AI and its potential risks, thereby reinforcing the EU's commitment to a comprehensive and harmonized legal framework for AI regulation.

Importantly, the AIA currently only mandates cybersecurity measures for high-risk systems (Art. 15) and for GPAI with systemic risk (Art. 55). The Joint Research Centre has issued helpful guidance for interpreting and implementing cybersecurity in the context of AI systems [72]. However, in our view, the regulatory framework in the AIA fails to mirror the fundamental importance of cybersecurity in our age. Generative AI models, in particular, are bound to become new building blocks for literally thousands of derived apps and products, functioning much like a new operating system in some respects. Hence, a backdoor created via insufficient cybersecurity will potentially enable attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in various derivative products. Therefore, economic efficiency (patching vulnerabilities once upstream instead of manifold times downstream) and prudence argue for stringent and obligatory cybersecurity measures for all GPAI, not only the largest ones ("systemic risk"), such as GPT-4 or Gemini. Strategic rivals, both nation-states and non-state actors, will be actively trying to exploit any vulnerabilities in advanced AI systems, particularly if the systems are widely used and integrated. Not addressing these threats for all GPAI seems naïve at best and irresponsible in the current and future geopolitical climate.

Hence, in our view, general-purpose AI systems should be included under the categories of Annex III CRA. This would ensure that they fulfill the most stringent cybersecurity requirements, including conformity assessments. In the current geopolitical climate, and with the importance of foundation models starting to rival those of operating systems (which are included in Annex III CRA already), this seems like a sensible update. In addition, a link between Article 55 of the AI Act and the CRA should be included for the cybersecurity requirements concerning systemic risk GPAIS, mirroring the integration of cybersecurity obligations for high-risk AI systems into the AI Act (Article 12 CRA).

In short, generative AI legislation needs a critical cybersecurity patch. Below, we show that several specific cybersecurity concerns remain unaddressed by the current regulatory landscape, including the AIA, CRA, and broader EU legislation.

5.2. Adversarial attacks

The complexity and high dimensionality of Generative AI models make them particularly susceptible to adversarial attacks, i.e., attempts to deceive the model and induce incorrect outputs—such as misclassification – by feeding carefully crafted, adversarial data. Cybersecurity is a national competence (Cybersecurity Act, Recital 5), but joint efforts to address it should still be pursued at the EU level, going beyond the general principle of AI robustness. Notably, the AIA mandates high-risk systems to implement technical measures to 'prevent or control attacks trying to manipulate the training dataset ('data poisoning'), inputs designed to cause the model to make a mistake ('adversarial examples'), or model flaws' (Article 15 (4)). The EU's Joint Research Centre has recently unveiled a comprehensive guidance document on cybersecurity measures in the context of AI and LLMs (Joint Research Centre (European Commission) et al. 2023). The European Parliament's draft legislation adds another layer. Article 28b asks GPAI providers to build

"appropriate cybersecurity and safety" safeguards, echoing the two-tiered approach tentatively agreed upon in the trilogue [13]. However, effectively countering adversarial attacks requires careful prioritization and targeting within any AI system, not just high-risk ones.

The AIA's risk levels, based on the likelihood of an AI system compromising fundamental legal values, are not a reliable predictor of vulnerability to adversarial attacks. Some AI deemed as high-risk by the AIA, e.g., for vocational training, may not have those technical traits that trigger adversarial attacks, and vice versa. Therefore, the AIA, and by extension the CRA, which relies on its risk classification, should provide, through N implementation acts, technical safeguards that are proportionate to the attack-triggers of a specific LLM, independently of the AIA risk levels. Attack-triggers include model complexity, overfitting, linear behaviour, gradient-based optimization, and exposure to universal adversarial triggers like input-agnostic sequences of tokens [73]. Finally, novel methods to counter adversarial attacks might involve limiting LLM access to trusted users or institutions and restricting the quantity or nature of user queries [74].

5.3. Misinformation

LLMs can disseminate misinformation easily, widely, and cheaply by attributing a high probability to false or misleading claims. This is mainly due to web-scraped training data containing false or non-factual information (e.g., fictional), which lacks truth value when taken out of context. Other times, an opinion reflecting the majority's viewpoint is misrepresented as truth despite not being verified facts. Misinformation may facilitate fraud, scams, targeted and non-targeted manipulation (e.g., during elections) (AlgorithmWatch AIForensics 2023), and cyberattacks [75,76].

A concerning aspect of natural language processing (NLP) in general is the phenomenon of "hallucinations". It refers to generating seemingly plausible text that diverges from the input data or contradicts factual information [77]. These hallucinations arise due to the models' tendency to extrapolate beyond their training data and synthesize information that aligns with their internal patterns, even if evidence does not support them. As a result, while NLP models may produce texts that demonstrate coherence, linguistic fluidity, and a semblance of authenticity, their outputs often lack fidelity to the original input and/or are misaligned with empirical truth and verifiable facts [78]. This can lead to a situation where uncritical reliance on LLMs results in erroneous decisions and a cascade of negative consequences [38], including spreading misinformation, especially if false outputs are shared without critical evaluation.

There are different kinds of LLMs' hallucinations [77], but we cannot discuss them here in detail. In the recent generation of LLMs—e.g., GPT4 and Bard—the 'Question and Answer' kind is widespread. These hallucinations manifest due to the models' tendency to provide answers even when presented with incomplete or irrelevant information [77,79] (. A recent study found that hallucinations are particularly common when using LLMs on a wide range of legal tasks [80].

EU legislation lacks specific regulations for misinformation created by Generative AI. As LLMs become increasingly integrated into online platforms, expanding the Digital Services Act (DSA) to include them and mandating online platforms to prevent misinformation seems the most feasible approach. Also, the project to strengthen the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (2022) can contribute, though its voluntary adherence reduces its overall effectiveness. Tackling LLM-generated misinformation requires updating both the AIA and the DSA. The DSA contains various provisions that can be fruitfully applied to LLMs, e.g., Article 22, which introduces "trusted flaggers" to report illegal content to providers and document their notification.

However, it is essential to broaden the DSA's scope and the content subject to platform removal duty, which currently covers only illegal content, as LLM-generated misinformation may be entirely lawful. Being the most technology-focused regulation, the AIA, or its implementing

acts, should tackle design and development guidelines to prevent LLMs from spreading misinformation. Normative adjustments should not only focus on the limitation of dataset size but also explore innovative strategies that accommodate LLMs' data hunger. Some measures might be identical (or similar to those) mentioned for adversarial attacks — restricting LLM usage to trusted users with limited interactions to prevent online misinformation proliferation⁵⁴ — while others may include innovative ideas like fingerprinting LLM-generated texts, training models on traceable radioactive data, or enhancing fact sensitivity using reinforcement learning techniques [74].

Specific solutions to address hallucinations in LLMs are crucial for mitigating the spread of misinformation and should be employed in policy-related applications. Numerous approaches have been proposed in the literature to address this challenge [81]. Some of these solutions are broad strategies that optimize dataset construction, such as implementing a self-curation phase within the instruction construction process. During this phase, the LLM identifies and selects high-quality demonstration examples (candidate pairs of prompts and responses) to fine-tune the underlying model to follow instructions better [82]. Other strategies address the alignment of LLMs with specific downstream applications—which can benefit from supervised fine-tuning [83] — as hallucinations often arise from discrepancies between the model's capabilities and the application's requirements [77].

Other approaches are narrower and focused on specific techniques, such as prompt engineering, to optimize the output generated by LLMs. This includes incorporating external authoritative knowledge bases (retrieval-augmented generation) [84] or introducing innovative coding strategies or faithfulness-based loss functions [81].⁵⁵

Another technical solution to mitigate hallucinations in LLMs worth considering is the Multiagent Debate approach, where multiple LLMs engage in an iterative process of proposing, debating, and refining their responses to a given query [85]. The aim is to achieve a consensus answer that is not only more accurate and factually correct but also preserves the richness of multiple perspectives. This approach draws inspiration from judicial techniques, particularly cross-examination, to foster a more rigorous examination of the LLMs' responses [86].

5.4. Ways forward: NIS2

The provisional agreement on the EU's updated Network and Information Systems Directive (NIS2 Directive) signifies a significant update to the bloc's cybersecurity framework, set to supersede the initial Network and Information Systems Directive. With its formal adoption expected soon, NIS2 extends coverage to more sectors and entities (Annexes I and II).

NIS2 mandates that designated essential and important entities adopt measures across technical, operational, and organizational domains to address risks to their network and information systems (Article 3 NIS2). These precautions aim to either prevent or mitigate the effects of cyber incidents on users, maintaining security proportionate to assessed risks (Article 21 (1) NIS2). It also introduces requirements for enhancing supply chain security, focusing on the relationship with direct suppliers and service providers to shield against cyber incidents.

The NIS2 Directive significantly expands cybersecurity measures beyond those of its predecessor, the NIS Directive, covering additional sectors and entities. This makes it highly relevant for those in Generative AI, including the digital infrastructure and services sectors, which would

naturally involve companies working with (Generative) AI. Additionally, NIS2 mandates quick incident reporting, requiring entities to inform authorities within 24 h of specific cybersecurity incidents (Article 23 point 4(a) NIS2). This is crucial for the AI sector, where only a rapid response to security breaches can mitigate the consequences, such as exploiting AI vulnerabilities or malicious AI activities.

In this context, the interplay between the NIS2 Directive and the CRA is crucial, particularly in how NIS2 can enhance or compensate for the CRA's limitations. For instance, the CRA proposal focuses on ensuring high cybersecurity standards for *products* (with digital elements, i.e., PDEs). Yet, it does not fully extend these standards to *services*, except for "remote data processing solutions" (Article 3 CRA) [87]. This gap could leave various generative AI models without adequate cybersecurity coverage, especially when these technologies are integrated into products or services beyond remote data processing. This includes scenarios where Generative AI and LLMs are part of more complex systems or services that offer decision-making, content generation, or predictive analytics. The NIS2 Directive takes a broader approach by targeting essential and significant entities, including cloud computing service providers. This implies that if generative AI and LLMs are offered through cloud services considered essential or significant (e.g., due to their size or the critical nature of the services they provide), they will fall under the cybersecurity and incident notification requirements of NIS2.

6. Conclusion and limitations

State-of-the-art Generative AI models, in general, and LLMs, in particular, exhibit high performance across a broad spectrum of tasks. Still, their unpredictable outputs raise concerns about the lawfulness and accuracy of the generated content. Overall, the EU does not seem adequately prepared to cope with these novelties. Policy proposals include updating current and forthcoming regulations, especially those encompassing AI more broadly, and enacting specific regulations for Generative AI. This article offers an overall analysis of some of the most pressing challenges and suggestions for addressing them.

In the realm of liability, the classification of Generative AI models within the AIA requires refinement, incorporating criteria beyond computational power to account for real-world risk scenarios. Additionally, the requirements for fault and defectiveness should be tailored to address the unique characteristics of LLMs, emphasizing techniques to manage randomness and incorporating monitoring measures. Furthermore, evidence disclosure mechanisms should be extended beyond high-risk systems and include specific guidelines on the content to be disclosed, ensuring user awareness of potential harm.

Privacy and data protection concerns are paramount under EU law. Most significantly, AI models might violate the GDPR through extensive scraping of personal data, AI training, particularly on sensitive data, and hallucinations. Several data protection inquiries are already underway in this context. Moreover, we argue that, under certain conditions, LLMs themselves may constitute personal data, which opens the door toward erasure requests concerning the entire model. Going forward, hence, a tailored GDPR exemption for AI training is warranted, accompanied by robust safeguards, to balance societal interests with individual rights. Adapting data governance measures from the AIA, implementing privacy-preserving techniques, and strengthening opt-out rights are crucial steps. The potential of machine unlearning techniques should also be explored to enhance the effectiveness of the right to erasure.

In intellectual property law, applying the TDM exception requires clarification, particularly regarding the permissible retention of copyrighted content and its applicability to validation and testing phases. Addressing the copyright infringement potential of LLM-generated outputs and establishing guidelines for IP protection eligibility in autonomous creations are also imperative.

The cybersecurity landscape requires the CRA to explicitly include Generative AI and align it with the AI Act's risk-based classification. Stricter cybersecurity measures for all general-purpose AI systems are

⁵⁴ For instance, the draft legislative proposal of the European Parliament requires that the provider of a foundation model (now GPai shall demonstrate the reduction and mitigation of reasonably foreseeable risks to democracy and the rule of law (Article 28b).

⁵⁵ Which basically means establishing a metric to measure faithfulness, that is, the extent to which a model's outputs align with the input data or established truths.

essential, given their potential vulnerabilities. Additionally, technical safeguards against adversarial attacks and strategies to combat misinformation, including potential DSA amendments, are vital. The NIS2 Directive offers a valuable tool to complement the CRA, ensuring cybersecurity for Generative AI models offered as services.

This paper acknowledges several limitations. The broader point about how best to proceed in developing a very complex and yet entirely coherent EU architecture of “digital laws” remains to be addressed. The regulatory environment for AI is continually evolving, with legislative instruments like the AILD, PLD, and CRA subject to amendments and updates that could significantly alter their application and effectiveness. Furthermore, many relevant legal rules discussed in this paper revolve around the AIA, whose enforcement and implementation remain somewhat ambiguous. Specifically, there is uncertainty regarding how governance structures will be established and function in practice [88]. These uncertainties have significant implications for national implementation strategies, leading to varying levels of expertise and readiness among member states in addressing the challenges of Generative AI regulation.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

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